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Change is the one constant in the intelligence profession today. / Technological advances are revolutionizing intelligence work. / World events are changing and broadening the areas and topics on which we must report. / Much the same is true for those of you in business or the professions. /

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But the change that I would like to talk about today / is the vast change in the environment in which American intelligence must work. / *within our country*

If you look back even 5-6 years, / American intelligence activities were largely isolated and secret, like those of other nations. / They were not subject to much discussion in the media. / Since *A75* the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, the Rockefeller Commission; the new oversight by the Congress, the White House, and the Intelligence Oversight Board, / we are on the front pages all the time. / The result is that today the intelligence profession must adapt / so that it can be more open with the public, / yet control that openness so that we can still do our job effectively. /

This has meant adapting our profession in four dimensions.
First, it has changed our internal operations and organization.
Secondly, it has changed how we work with the rest of the Executive
Branch. Thirdly, it has altered our relationships with the Legislative
Branch; and, finally, it has thrown us into much greater contact
with you, the American public. Whether, with these changes in the
way we operate, we can still do the job the country wants and needs
is rightfully an issue of public concern. Let me, then, look at
each of these dimensions in the light of the considerable discussion
today about how freely the CIA should be allowed to operate; where
it is too shackled; and how it should be unshackled. And, if there
is some unshackling, are there risks to our Constitutional rights?

First, the internal dimension - Internally the CIA has a
number of separate departments, each doing a different part of the
Agency's work. They used to be carefully compartmented from each
other to help protect secrets by minimizing, even within the Agency
itself, the access to sensitive information.

Obviously, there are risks when compartmentation is too tight:
people may make decisions without all of the available facts,
or judgments may be too narrowly focused. If there were mistakes
in the past, I suspect that they were because the Agency was
operating with too narrow a perspective. It was not maliciousness
or callousness, or that the Agency was ever out of control. It was
not.

Today, to ensure that compartmentation does not impede sound judgment, we are moving toward a more corporate organizational structure. I use corporate in the sense that we are becoming more consultative, more collegial, better organized for long run decisionmaking. We are hoping not to become bureaucratic and less flexible as we mature.

The disadvantage of this more corporate approach is that as you increase the number of those who know about a secret activity, you also increase the level of risk that that activity will be compromised. To reduce that risk, while we expand the number of offices participating in decisionmaking we try to minimize the number of individuals who participate and the degree of detail that an individual needs to carry out his role. We are trying to find a happy medium between the dangers of isolated decisionmaking and the proliferation of information about sensitive activities to a point that they will no longer be secret.

// The second dimension of change in our environment is that the CIA is less independent externally today as well. We are less like a small family business than we used to be. Within the Executive Branch, we are more like one part of a corporate conglomerate. Our board of directors is the National Security Council, chaired by the President. The Council provides a far greater degree of direction to our collection, analysis and covert actions than has ever been the case before.

actuator

There are pluses and minuses to this, as well. / A big plus is that it ties us intimately / to the policymakers and their deliberations. / We can be more effective in providing the data which they need / if we know what their concerns really are. / *Another big plus - FBI encourages -*

A minus, however, / *even within Exec Branch* is that the probability of a damaging leak of secret information / is geometrically proportional to the number of people who know it. / It doesn't matter much where the people are located. / Within the Executive Branch, *for instance* there is always *a* the danger / that people with misplaced loyalties / will try to influence policy by taking their case to the public / through the leaking of secret information. / The inhibitions of self-restraint and patriotism / that prevailed in this country before Vietnam / are less prevalent in the no-holds-barred, post-Watergate environment. / I can assure you it makes the job of intelligence much more difficult. /

// The third dimension of change is the greater interplay we have with the Congress. / In years past, a few senior Senators and Representatives were kept informed of intelligence activities / but the general attitude was, / don't tell me too much; *I want to stay out of that.*

Today, that attitude is long gone. /

Again there are pluses and minuses. / The advice and counsel of the Congress / helps us to keep in closer touch with the public, / and

helps us to understand what is expected of us. It also affords us a somewhat detached insight into our activities, and ultimately the Congress shares some responsibility for what we do.

The primary disadvantage is, again, the danger of leaks. In terms of leaks, Congress is neither better nor worse than the Executive Branch.

Overall, the process of sharing with the Congress and gaining their advice has worked well in the three years that I have been privileged to participate in it. I want to continue that relationship. Why, then, has there been a controversy in recent weeks over the terms of that relationship?

charters It is because we are attempting to codify current practices into law. In so doing we are inadvertently attempting to establish a degree of precision which cannot be achieved. Intelligence is not a science. It is a craft - even, at times, an art. An element of trust is vital because without it, flexibility is lost. And, an intelligence organization that lacks flexibility is just another bureaucracy.

The current effort to replace some trust with all law concentrates on two particular issues. How soon should we notify the Congress of what we are doing; and at what level of detail?

The question of how soon we notify the Congress is, at its essence, a constitutional issue. It brings into question what the

Founding Fathers intended when they separated the powers of the government. The powers given the Congress in the Constitution are essentially to appropriate, to legislate, to impeach and for the Senate, to advise and consent on Executive appointments. There is no provision in the Constitution for prior consultation by the Executive with the Legislature on actions the Executive is taking within his constitutional sphere.

A recent editorial in a major newspaper revealed how much confusion there is today on this division of authorities. It complained that if the Congress were not informed of intelligence community actions in advance of their implementation, the President would be deprived of Congressional consultation. Consultation has a nice voluntary ring to it. But, when consultation is prescribed by law it is not voluntary. It becomes a mechanism for pre-judging and, consequently, for controlling Presidential actions. If the Congress were to pre-judge every Presidential action and be able to veto it in advance, the President would be unable to negotiate treaties, act on domestic emergencies, control our exports and imports, or take any number of actions which he must be able to take for the best interests of this country. Foreign intelligence is no different. De facto Congressional veto power would deny the President the opportunity to take necessary initiatives - to lead. Instead, he would become, at the least, an adjunct of the Congress; at the worst, its puppet.

// With respect to the amount of detail that we must share with the Congress, our concern is less with the actual sharing than with the perception of others. Outside of our country, there are few who understand why and how we bring Congress into the intelligence process. Agents of ours overseas and intelligence services on whom we depend know that their effectiveness, even their well being, depends upon secrecy. They also know that a politician's viability depends to a large extent on public relations. We cannot easily persuade them that if we share information about our dealings with them in intimate detail with the Congress, it can be kept private. And, when they are not convinced that their equities, maybe their lives, can be protected, they usually choose not to take the risk. The loss is ours.

In practice, in my three years of association with the committees of Congress, they have exercised extraordinarily good judgment in not pressing us for a level of detail that was unnecessary for their purposes. To my knowledge, they have never complained that we have provided them with inadequate detail to perform their oversight or legislative role effectively.

// Finally, this greater openness has changed our relationship with the Fourth Estate and with the American public. We need and seek better public understanding. No important public institution in this country can survive unless it has the confidence and support of the American ^{people} public. We have tried in recent years

to be more open. / But, we have been more open in terms of
declassifying and distributing our product / whenever that is possible. /
Through making more of our analyses and studies available, / we hope
to provide the public / with some visible return on its investment
in us. /

At the same time, we have been scrupulous / in not talking about
our sources or our methods, of gathering intelligence, / ~~for the same~~
~~reasons that every journalist refuses to reveal his sources.~~ /
We, ~~as they~~, expect to protect the confidence of our sources, to use
them again, / and to encourage others to confide in us. / We also
protect information which is particularly useful to our policymakers /
because they alone have it / and no one else suspects that they have
it. / The value of an exclusive is obvious. /

Thus is our new openness is a controlled openness. / It will
work only / if we can truly control access to secret information / and
thus reduce the danger of leaks. / That is the most serious challenge
to the intelligence profession today. / We are asking the Congress
to help us with this in three areas. /

First, there is the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. / This has been
interpreted to require / that anytime we undertake a covert action, /
we must notify up to eight committees of the Congress. / Revealing a
covert action to more than a handful of people / can risk lives
unnecessarily, / and mocks the title "covert". / We want to reduce
that notification / to the two committees that oversee us, / on which

the other six committees are represented. / There would, then, still be knowledge of covert actions in those committees when germane to their proceedings.

We are also asking for very limited relief / from the Freedom of Information Act. / Today, when you, the Russian Embassy, / or anybody else asks for information from our files, / the law requires that we *must defer* must respond as soon as possible. / Again, this a problem particularly because of the perceptions / of foreign liaison services and foreign agents. / How do you persuade someone to risk his life for us / if he fears that I may be required by law / to reveal his name in public? / We are willing to provide our citizens any unclassified information / that we may have on them as individuals / and to respond to inquiries about our product. / Yet we must ensure our continued ability / to protect our sources from disclosure / and they must perceive that we can and will do this. /

Lastly, we are asking for legislation / to let us prosecute those who traitorously disclose / the names of our officers and agents around the world. / With acknowledged deliberateness, people like Philip Agee / and those of his ilk / are trying to undermine a legally constituted institution of our government / which we all pay for with our tax dollars. / With deliberate irresponsibility, / they are making intelligence more expensive than it need be, / reducing our effectiveness, / and putting American lives in jeopardy. / To permit this to continue would be ludicrous. /

// Please note that none of the three measures of relief I have just described constitute meaningful relaxation of controls over the Central Intelligence Agency. They could not be described as an unleashing; or a return to the good old days. They are simply steps toward restoring a modicum of essential secrecy. We can move in these directions quite safely today because of the new and effective oversight procedures that have been established within both the Executive and Legislative Branches in recent years.

Still, secrecy, any secrecy, will always seem an anachronism in our society. And, covert action will always conflict with the American tradition of fair play. But, ultimately we must recognize that in some circumstances of international competition the Marquis of Queensbury's rules are inappropriate. If we are to continue to be free and to function as a world leader, we must know what is going on around us. A strong intelligence capability is clearly necessary. Carping at a reasonable level of secrecy and reasonable freedom to act covertly against hostile countries is naive and destructive.

We, in the intelligence profession, are the sons and daughters of this nation just as you are. We are well aware of the nation's ethical standards and Constitutional rights and your quite reasonable insistence in that they be preserved. We have no intention of violating your trust nor undermining the very values that we are committed to defend.

We do not ask simply to be trusted in this regard. We strongly endorse continuation of the oversight process both in the Executive and Legislative Branches. It holds us fully accountable for our actions; it permits us to function effectively; it works.

// Today, then, we are poised at a balance point which, if tipped any further in the direction of loosening controls over secrecy, will adversely affect our capability as a secret intelligence service. We do not ask to be unshackled. We ask to continue just as we have, successfully, over the past three years. I know of no accusation of illegality, impropriety, or abuse, nor any cause for such an accusation. I know of no inference that the oversight process has not been thorough or effective during that time.

We are in the process of constructing a uniquely American model of intelligence. It is tailored to American values and to our concept of the rights and privileges of the individual, yet it permits us to do what needs to be done to preserve our national security. I ask for your understanding and your support in completing the construction of this bold new concept. Thank you very much.